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STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Whether or not the doctrine of res judicata
is available to bar the appellant's personal
injury action against the respondent.

Whether

or not the doctrine of collateral

estoppel precludes the litigation of whether
the shooting was intentional or unintentional
in the event this Court rules against res
judicata

as a bar to appellant's personal

injury action.

Whether or not the doctrine of interspousal
immunity

bars

between spouses.

unintentional

tort

actions

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ELAINE HANSON NOBLE,

]

Plaintiff/Appellant,
i

Supreme Court No. 20401

vs.
)

V. GLEN NOBLE,
Defendant/Respondent.

RESPONDENTS BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND CASE
On the night of August 18, 1980, Elaine Hanson Noble, the
appellant, was shot during a struggle with V. Glen Noble, the
respondent, over a gun in her possession.

Mr. Noble claims the

shooting was accidental since the gun fired as a result of his
attempt to wrest it away from Mrs. Noble to prevent her from
harming herself.

(D.R.

638-641).*

Mrs. Noble contends the

shooting was caused either intentionally or negligently by her
husband,

Glen Noble.

(P.I.R.

88-94).

At

the time of the

shooting, the couple was living together and had been married
approximately three years.
A

criminal

action

(D.R. 608).

was

brought

against

Glen

Noble

attempted murder and he was acquitted on all charges.

for
(D.R.

650) .
1

As with the appellant's brief, references to the record
in the respondent's brief will identify the personal injury
case record as P.I.R. (Appeal No. 2041) and will identify the
divorce case record as D.R. (Appeal No. 19934).

On March

13,

1981, Glen Noble

commenced

an

action

for

divorce against Elaine Noble and she counterclaimed for divorce.
(D.R. 5-11).
Noble

During the pendency of the divorce action, Elaine

commenced

a

separate

personal

injury

action

Glen Noble initially alleging that he negligently
injury

and

later,

after

amendment,

alleging

88-94).

caused her

that

negligently or intentionally caused her injury•

against

he

either

(P.I.R. 6-8;

He answered by generally denying her allegations and

he raised the defense that the doctrine of interspousal immunity
barred

the

negligence

cause

of

action.

(P.I.R.

18-19).

Thereafter, on April 19, 1983, the trial court granted partial
summary judgment in favor of Mr. Noble dismissing the negligence
cause of action ruling it was barred by interspousal immunity.
The

cause

remained.

of

action

for

intentionally

caused

injury

still

(P.I.R. 132-133).

The divorce action came to trial on December 22-23, 1983,
and January 23, 1984, before Judge Tibbs.
During

the

course

of

the

trial,

Mrs.

(D.R.
Noble

107-123).

presented

a

substantial amount of evidence directly bearing on the cause of
her personal injury and damages she incurred as a result of it.
Testimony was received from four police officers who investigated
the shooting; a psychologist who described Mrs. Noble's mental
incapacities since the shooting; a neurologist who described her

2

brain damage as a result of the shooting; and other witnesses
that testified to her injury and resulting damages.

Exhibits

were received that consisted, among others, of a photograph of
the gun; x-rays of Mrs. Noble's skull and the bloodied bedding
from where the shooting occurred.

(P.I.R. 108-115).

Judge Tibbs granted Elaine Noble's counterclaim for divorce
and denied Glen Noble's claim for divorce.

His ruling recited

that Mrs. Noble was intentionally shot by Mr. Noble, that she
was

rendered

permanently

expectancy of 38.5 years.

disabled

and

that

she

had

a

life

He awarded her alimony in the amount

of $750 a month and awarded her a property settlement valued at
$274,161 from Mr. Noble's assets allegedly valued at $800,000.
(D.R.

138-150) .

Mrs. Noble had brought into the three year

marriage a half interest
automobile.

in a small house, furniture and an

(D.R. 657).

At a hearing that reviewed the divorce action findings of
fact and conclusions of law held on April 13, 1984, Judge Tibbs
stated that the divorce action and the tort action were all
interwoven

and

he

took

the

personal

injury

issues

into

consideration when he heard the divorce case and ruled upon the
distribution of property and award of alimony.

(D.R. 300-308).

Mr. Noble timely filed a Notice of Appeal from that action on May

3

1, 1984.

The appeal, number 19934, is presently pending before

this Court.
Thereafter, on July 12, 1984, Mr. Noble brought a motion to
dismiss the personal injury action based upon the doctrine of
res

judicata

because

the

divorce

action

had

litigated

the

personal injury issues and made an award that encompassed those
claimed damages to Mrs. Noble.

(P.I.R. 176).

The trial court

granted the motion on December 14, 1984, and Mrs. Noble filed a
Notice of Appeal.

(P.I.R. 197-198).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The

doctrine

of

res

judicata

bars

the

appellant

from

maintaining this personal injury action against the respondent.
Res judicata is applicable when a prior action and a subsequent
action involve the same partes or their privies, when there has
been a final judgment on the merits in the prior action and the
prior action involved the same issue or an issue that could have
been raised in the prior action.

It is the respondents conten-

tion that all the elements of res judicata have been met in this
instance since the parties are identical, a final judgment was
entered in the divorce action and the trial court in the divorce
action

fully

proceeding.

adjudicated

the

Statements

from

personal
the

injury

trial

court

claim

in

that

unequivocally

indicate that he granted the appellant an award for the personal

4

injury claim that was combined
settlement determination.

into the alimony and property

Accordingly, res judicata bars the

appellant from bringing this second action which would result in
her obtaining a double recovery - a personal injury damage award
in the prior action and a second
damage award in the case at hand.

"windfall" personal

injury

The trial court correctly

dismissed the appellant's action based on the doctrine of res
judicata.
Sufficient

portions

of

the

divorce

action

record

were

before the trial court to enable it to render an informed and
proper ruling on whether this action was barred by res judicata.
It is not necessary to submit the entire record of the prior
action to the court.

Based on sufficient evidence of the prior

proceeding, including Judge Tibb's statement that he considered
the personal injury issues when he made the property settlement
and alimony determination in the divorce proceeding, the trial
court

correctly

determined

the

appellant's

personal

injury

action was barred.
The fact that the divorce action judgment has been appealed
does not alter its finality for res judicata purposes.

The

general rule of law, is that a judgment remains final despite the
taking of an appeal.

5

In the event that this Court rules res judicata

is not

available to bar the appellant's personal injury action, then
the appellant's contention that collateral

estoppel precludes

litigation of whether the shooting was intentional must fail.
The

doctrine

of

collateral

estoppel

or

issue

preclusion

available only after a four element test has been met.

is

One of

the elements is that a final judgment be rendered on the merits.
Another element is that a determination of the issue be essential
to the judgment.

The issue of whether or not the shooting was

intentional was not essential to the granting of the divorce
decree since the decree could have been based on two independent
statutory grounds - habitual drunkenness or cruel treatment.

For

these reasons, the appellant will be unable to meet two elements
of the test for application of collateral estoppel, hence the
issue of whether the shooting was intentional or unintentional
may be litigated again.
Lastly, the trial court correctly ruled that the appellant's
unintentional

tort

claim

interspousal immunity.

was

barred

by

the

doctrine

of

While the Utah Supreme Court has carved

out an exception to the immunity for intentional tort actions
between spouses, it has left in place the doctrine as a complete
bar to unintentional

tort actions.

The respondent maintains

that this Court should not completely abrogate the doctrine for
6

both

intentional

and unintentional

torts.

There are public

policy reasons for retaining immunity because it promotes marital
harmony, prevents collusive lawsuits, avoids trivial and spurious
lawsuits

and

prevents

rewarding

the

tortfeasor

wrongdoing by indirectly benefiting in an award.

spouse

for

Numerous other

jurisdictions have relied upon these public policy considerations
to partially abrogate interspousal immunity for intentional torts
while leaving it as a bar to unintentional tort actions.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURTS ALIMONY AND PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AWARDS
INCLUDED COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL INJURY AND
IS RES JUDICATA TO A SECOND ACTION ON ANY
PART OF THE SAME CLAIM.
A.

The Doctrine of Res Judicata
Personal Injury Action.

Bars

the

Appellant's

The rule in all jurisdictions is that a judgment entered in
a divorce proceeding is conclusive upon the parties as to all
matters that were litigated in that action when a subsequent
suit is brought upon the same or substantially the same cause of
action.

In this connection, causes of action are not different

by virtue merely of their form or the relief sought, but are
considered the same cause of action where a different judgment in
the second action would impair the interest established by the
first.

See, 27A C.J.S. Divorce § 174(3); Costantini v. Trans
7

World Airlines, 681 F.2d 1199, 1201 (9th Cir. 1982) (res judicata
not avoided merely because new legal theory pleaded).
In numerous settings courts have applied the doctrine of
res judicata to bar a second action where it was advanced upon
the same or substantially the same cause of action that was
litigated in a prior determination.

Indeed, claim preclusion

bars a second action that had any part of the claim determined in
the original action and must necessarily be applied regardless of
any ad hoc determination of the equities in a particular case.
See, Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394,
401 (1981).
In Hall v. Hall, 455 So.2d 813 (Ala. 1984), a divorced wife
brought an action against her former husband alleging that he had
induced her to consent to a divorce by representing that he
wanted

a

divorce

for

business

reasons

and

that

they

would

continue to live together; however, in reality he wanted the
divorce so he could marry another woman.

The wife's tort action

was for fraud, conspiracy to defraud, and bad faith.

The court,

noting that the divorce decree had been determined based upon
oral testimony, stated:
An inquiry into the damages she suffered by
relying on the defendant's representations
would necessarily require an inquiry into the
adequacy of the award in the divorce action.
Since [the plaintiff] has chosen not to

8

attack the award in the divorce decree, she
should be bound by it.
Id.. at 815.
In the case at hand, the appellant does not wish to set
aside the divorce award but is attempting to obtain an additional
"windfall"

award

by

bringing

a

separate

tort

action.

The

appellant's injuries were an integral part of the alimony and
property

settlement award and as such are res judicata to a

second suit.

The divorce court based a considerable portion of

the alimony and property settlement awards on the injuries of the
appellant.

This

fact

is evidenced

by

the

great

amount

of

personal injury testimony and evidence introduced at trial by the
appellant,

including

a

substantial

amount

of

testimony

from

medical experts who described her injuries in great detail.
In Coucrhlin v. Christoffersen. 431 P.2d 997 (Wash. 1967), a
wife brought an action for defamation and alienation of affection
against

her

former

husband.

The

court,

after

granting

the

husband's motion to dismiss because the action was res judicata
in the divorce decree, stated:
[0]ur review of the record shows that all
causes of action well pleaded in the instant
complaint against plaintiff's former husband
were heard and disposed of in the divorce
decree and that the order of dismissal
should be and is affirmed.
Id.. at 998.

9

In the instant action, the appellant effectively tried the
tort action as part of the divorce proceeding.

She presented

extensive testimony as to the shooting through physical evidence
and a number of witnesses, including a doctor, four policemen, a
psychologist,

relatives

and

neighbors.

Certainly,

the

same

evidence (witnesses and damages) presented in the divorce action
would

be principally

injury action.
settlement
injury.

relied

upon

in the

subsequent

personal

Furthermore, the courtfs alimony and property

award was

specifically

premised

In the hearing on April

upon the personal

13, 1984, to consider the

findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court in the
divorce

action

specifically

stated

that

the

tort

case

was

interwoven into the divorce action and that the divorce findings
encompassed

the tort action.

(D.R. 300-302; 307-308).

The

trial judge in court room exchange with respondent's counsel,
stated:
I do not think there is any way of trying the
divorce action and not trying the tort case.
I think it was because it is all interwoven.
That is why I tried to get to the point, but
I could not do it (D.R. 300) . . .
All right, now let's get back and read
[finding] no. 8 . . . That is the tort case.
If you want to argue, that is what I found.
I do not have any doubt about that.
(D.R.
301) .

10

Of course, I cannot

there is no way I can

eliminate the tort action.

(D.R. 302)•

Thus, the trial court was fully aware of the pending tort
action, had received evidence of the injury and had made alimony
and property settlement awards based upon the injuries sustained
in the personal injury as part of the divorce proceeding.

The

court, in responding to the appellant's request for findings,
noted:
I am not going to do it like you suggested,
but I am not adverse to saying something like
that, that the court has considered all the
property owned by the parties and the court
has considered the injuries that Mrs. Noble
sustained in reaching this decision. . . .
(D.R. 306).
There is no question that I considered the
situation of the parties as of the time of
the action, both their mental and physical
health, and there is no question that I tried
to reach a decision which I thought was a
fair and proper and equitable distribution of
all of the property that I had knowledge of.
(D.R. 307-308).
Clearly, the trial court in the divorce proceeding included
the personal injury claim as part of the alimony and property
settlement awards.

By so doing, the trial court extinguished all

rights of the appellant with respect to all or any part of the
transaction out of which the cause of action arose.

The doctrine

of res judicata includes facts which are related in time, space,
origin and motivation.

Thus, res judicata applies to extinguish

11

the appellant's claim even though she asserts an alternative
theory in the second action.

See, Costantini v. Trans World

Airlines. 681 F.2d 1199 (9th Cir. 1982).
In Krofcheck v. Downey State Bank, 580 P.2d 243 (Utah 1978),
the Utah Supreme Court set out the elements of res judicata as
(1) the two cases must be between the same parties or their
privies; (2) there must have been a final judgment on the merits
of the prior case; and

(3) the prior adjudication must have

involved the same issue or an issue that could or should have
been raised.

Clearly, all the requirements of res judicata have

been fulfilled in the case at hand since the parties are the
same, a final judgment has been rendered, and the trial judge in
the divorce case adjudicated the personal injury issue.
The trial judge, Judge Tibbs, unequivocally stated that the
alimony

and property

personal injuries.

settlement

determination

encompassed

At the April 13, 1984, hearing he stated:

You [appellant's counsel] didn't think there
should be anything in my findings saying
that I considered the injuries and damages?
Really, haven't I really — I looked at the
whole thing.
Of course, I heard it and I
made a decision and now for you to say, "you
didn't do that Judge," seems to me like —
aren't they [plaintiff] entitled to say,
Judge, you considered all these things?
. . . (D.R. 327).
And, the damage, whether you call it damage
or whether you call it property settlement,
whether you call it alimony doesn't make any

the

difference really.
Thatfs there, and that
was it. (D.R. 330).
There can be no doubt that the trial court awarded compensation for the tort injuries, hence the doctrine of res judicata
must be applied.
The Utah Supreme Court has denied two bites of the same
apple as a matter of law in past decisions.

In Wheadon v.

Pearson. 14 Utah 2d 45, 376 P.2d 946, 948 (1962), the plaintiff
brought an action to establish a right of way by prescriptive
easement.

The trial court rendered

defendants favor.

summary

judgment

in the

Later, the plaintiff filed a second lawsuit

asserting an implied easement claim.

The trial court dismissed

the second lawsuit and was upheld on appeal.

This Court affirmed

the application of the bar of res judicata by denying the second
action.

In the decision it was stated:
Policy would seem to indicate that when a
plaintiff has once attempted to obtain his
entire relief, based upon his entire claim,
then the matter should be laid at rest. He
should be denied a second attempt at
substantially the same objective under a
different guise.

Id., at 948.
In the case at hand, the appellant persisted in trying the
tort

claim

before the divorce

court

and

received

inordinate

alimony and property settlement awards based upon her personal
injuries.

Thus, having obtained the sought after personal injury
13

damages in the divorce action, the appellant should be denied a
second attempt at the same objective under guise of a personal
injury action.
In Walther v. Walther, 709 P.2d 387 (Utah 1985), this Court
mandated the principle that tort actions are not to be tried as
separate claims in divorce actions.
court

made

a

$5,000

award

for

In Walther, the divorce

the

wifefs

battery

claim.

Restating the mandate of Lord v. Shaw, 665 P.2d 1288 (Utah 1983),
this Court stated in Walther:
We believe that divorce actions will become
unduly
complicated
in their trial and
disposition if torts can be or must be
litigated in the same action.
The administration of justice will be better served by
keeping the two proceedings separate.
Id., at 388.
The appellant herein is attempting to skirt the mandate of
Walther by trying the tort claim in divorce court, obtaining
damages

and

then

personal injuries.

subsequently

bringing

a

second

action

for

The appellant insisted on presenting evidence

solely appropriate to the tort action at time of the divorce
trial.

Having once obtained a judgment on the merits, she is

barred from a second action on the same claim.

Thus, as a matter

of law, the appellant must not be allowed to go forward with this
second action since she is barred from doing so by the doctrine
of res judicata.
14

B.

The Record of the Divorce Case was Properly Before
the Trial Court.

The trial court properly based its res judicata ruling on
pertinent portions of the record which were before it.

The

appellant's contention that the entire record must be before the
court to render a res judicata ruling is without merit.
The latest statement of the proper rule came from the New
Mexico Supreme Court in 1985, in International Paper Company v.
Farrar. 102 N.M. 739, 700 P.2d 642 (1985).

There, the defendant

attempted to invoke collateral estoppel to prevent the plaintiff
from re-litigating a claim for $18,315.00 in damages he received
in a prior suit.

The Court stated the rule is that "sufficient

evidence" of the prior action must be provided to the trial
court.
It is the burden of the movant invoking the
doctrine of collateral estoppel to introduce
sufficient evidence for the Court to rule
whether the doctrine is applicable.
700 P.2d at 645 (emphasis added).
In

State

Farm

Fire

and

Casualty

Co.

v.

Century

Home

Components, Inc., 550 P.2d 1185 (Ore. 1976), the facts were that
a fire started in a manufacturing plant and spread to adjacent
buildings.

The owners of the adjacent property brought numerous

actions against

the manufacturer who procured

judgments and some adverse.

some

favorable

Later, thirteen additional claimants
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brought suit against the manufacturer to recover damages.

The

trial court ruled that the manufacturer was collaterally estopped
from contesting liability and it appealed.

The Oregon Supreme

Court stated:
The party asserting estoppel bears the
responsibility of placing into evidence the
prior judgment and sufficient portions of the
record . . . to enable the court to reach
that conclusion with the requisite degree of
certainty.
Id., at 1188.
It

(emphasis added).

is clear

that

in the

case

at hand,

the

respondent

introduced more than sufficient evidence for the trial court to
make an informed and proper ruling.

This Court took judicial

notice of the files and records of the divorce case and had
before it substantial portion of the transcript of the testimony
and arguments.

The memorandum supporting the motion to dismiss

before Judge Ballif contained the following pertinent statements
from the divorce record wherein Judge Tibbs unequivocally stated:
What I was trying to do is reach, solve all
your lawsuits all at once and I will make the
decision right now.
I have got all the
assets before me and got the parties before
me and I would settle everything, including
the other action too. I don't think, that is
not very hard to decide on, is it?
(D.R.
208) .
*

*

*

I am saying I would make a decision resolving
all issues between the parties in this
16

action. There would be no further lawsuit,
period, not only the one that is filed
— that would be gone.
They wouldn't be
able to file the lawsuits against each other
for anything that happened in the past from
this day back.
It would be all over,
everything over, and I would just make a
decision involving the parties period, so
there would be no lawsuits.
The personal
injury lawsuit would be gone and both parties
would be prevented from suing each other for
anything that happened prior to this date.
(D.R. 208).
(P.I.R. 169) (Emphasis added).
These

statements,

memorandum,

with

cites

among
to

others,

the

quoted

divorce

in

record,

Mr.

Noble's

gives

strong

indication of Judge Tibb's intentions in the divorce case.

Judge

Ballif properly relied on these statements and others to make his
ruling to bar the personal injury action based on res judicata.
After Mr. Noble presented his memorandum to the trial court, the
burden shifted to the plaintiff to "bring to the trial court's
attention circumstances indicating the absence of a full and fair
opportunity to contest the issue in the first action or other
considerations which would make the application of [res judicata]
unfair."

State Farm, supra, 550 P.2d at 1189.

The plaintiff

could not meet this burden at the trial court level; therefore,
the ruling should stand.
Despite the fact that both cases discussed above involved
collateral estoppel and not res judicata is of no consequence
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because the reasoning underlying the doctrines is identical.
judicata,

like

collateral

estoppel,

is

a

judicial

Res

economy

argument designed to promote judicial efficiency by precluding
claims or issues which were litigated previously.
The appellant cites two cases in support of her position.
In the first, Searle Brothers v. Searle. 588 P.2d

689

(Utah

1978), this Court did not hold that "sufficient portions" from a
trial record are insufficient to examine and use as a basis for
rendering a res judicata ruling; rather, the Court, citing Parish
v. Lavton Citv Corp.. 542 P.2d 1086 (Utah 1975), stated that the
record was "not necessarily examined independently by the trial
court."

Searle Brothers. 588 P.2d at 692.

Such language is not

enough to support the sweeping proposition which the appellant
advocates.

She also cites Parish, noting that "since the record

was not before the trial court, there is no basis to sustain the
determination

that

the

plaintiff's

doctrine of res judicata."
Respondent

asserts

claim

was

barred

by

the

of

the

Parish. 542 P.2d at 1087.

that

the

substantial

portion

transcript from the divorce trial provided to Judge Ballif was
sufficient for him to make the res judicata ruling.

Judge Tibb's

comment from the transcript was unmistakeable when he said that
he sought to "resolve all issues between the parties."
209) .
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(D.R.

In the event this Court should find that the evidence before
Judge Ballif was insufficient, this Court, as appellant properly
points out, has independent power to take judicial notice of the
divorce record

(Appeal No. 19,934) which is currently pending

appeal before this Court.
897, 575 P.2d 495

City of Caldwell v. Roark, 98 Idaho

(1978).

A res judicata determination is a

matter of law and as such, this Court can properly determine
whether the trial

court

erred

in dismissing

the

appellantfs

personal injury claim on the basis of res judicata.
C.

A Judgment Pending on Appeal Should be Allowed Res
Judicata Effect.

The judgment which was relied upon by the trial court to bar
appellant's personal injury action is pending appeal before this
Court.

Under Utah law, as reiterated some thirty-five years ago

in Young v. Hansen. 118 Utah 1, 218 P.2d 674 (1950), a case on
appeal cannot bar another action as res judicata because such an
action is not deemed "final".
law as expressed

The respondent contends that the

in Young is outmoded and inapposite to the

majority and better reasoned rule.

The "federal rule" holds that

the pendency of an appeal does not suspend the operation of an
otherwise final judgment.

See, Deposit Bank v. Frankfurt, 191

U.S. 499 (1903); Reed v. Allen, 286 U.S. 191 (1932); 18 Wright,
Miller and Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction §
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4433

(1981) ; IB J. Moore, J.

Lucas and T. Currier, Mooref s

Federal Practice § 0.416 [3] (2d Ed. 1984).
The Restatement (Second) of Judgments also establishes that
a case is deemed final even when it is pending appeal:
A judgment otherwise final for purposes of
the law of res judicata is not deprived of
such finality by the fact that time still
permits commencement of proceedings in the
trial court to set aside the judgment and
grant a new trial or the like. . . . There
have been differences of opinion about
whether, or in what circumstances, a judgment
can be considered final for purposes of res
judicata when proceedings have been taken to
reverse or modify it by appeal. The better
view is that a . judgment otherwise final
remains so despite the taking of an appeal
unless, what is called an appeal actually
consists of a trial de novo.
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 13 comment f (1982).
This

rule was

recently

reaffirmed

by

the United

States

Supreme Court in Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie. 452
U.S. 394 (1981).

Seven private anti-trust actions were filed

against Federated alleging that it had violated the Sherman Act
by agreeing to fix the retail price of women's clothing sold in
northern California.
dismissed

for

failure

business or property.

The actions were consolidated and later
to

allege

injury

to

the

plaintiffs1

Five of the seven plaintiffs appealed,

but Moitie and one other plaintiff (Brown) choose to refile in
state court.

Federated removed to Federal Court whereupon the
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actions were dismissed under the doctrine of res judicata, even
though

the

other

five

plaintiffs

had

appealed

the

previous

ruling.
Based upon an intervening decision of the Supreme Court, the
five plaintiffs prevailed on appeal.
appealed

Moitie and Brown then

the res judicata ruling to the Ninth Circuit.

The

circuit court reversed based upon the closely interwoven nature
of the two plaintiffs claims to the other five.

The Ninth

Circuit held that the doctrine of res judicata "must, in rare
instances, give way to overriding concerns of public policy and
simple

justice."

611 F.2d

1267, 1269

Moitie v. Federated

Department Stores, Inc., F.2d (9th Cir. 1980).

The Supreme Court

reversed, holding that the res judicata principles of a final
judgment on the merits are not altered by the fact that the
judgment may have been wrong or rested on a legal principle
subsequently overruled on appeal.

The Court stated:

Simple justice is achieved when a complete
body of law developed over a period of years
is evenhandedly applied . . . public policy
dictates that there be an end of litigation;
that those who have contested an issue shall
be bound by the result of the contest, and
that matters once tried shall be forever
settled as between the parties. . . . [T]he
doctrine of res judicata being not a mere
matter of practice or procedure inherited
from a more technical time than ours, [but
rather] . . .
a rule of fundamental and
substantial iustice of public policy and of
private peace. . . .

452 U.S. at 401. (Citations omitted).
The Supreme Court thus reinforced the notion that a judgment
is final even though on appeal.
equity

"[N]o principle of law or

. . . sanctions the rejection

. . .

of the salutary

principle of res judicata [even on the basis of 'simple justice1
or public policy].
Thus, Moitie
"federal

rule",

Id.
stands, not

but

as

a

only

strong

as

a restatement

indication

Court that the doctrine of res judicata

by

the

of the
Supreme

is supreme and that

allowing "public policy" and "simple justice" to override the
"fundamental and substantial justice" of the principles underlying the doctrine of res judicata is erroneous.
Appellant relies on the case of Young v. Hansen, 218 P.2d
674 to support her position.

Respondent, however, notes that in

light of more recent cases such as Moitie, the continued vitality
of Young is suspect.

In Young, this Court held that a judgment

is not final pending appeal.

The opinion was based on three Utah

cases; State Bank of Sevier v. American Cement and Plaster Co.,
80 Utah 250, 10 P.2d 1065 (1932); Schramm-Johnson Drugs v. Kleeb,
51 Utah 159, 169 P. 161 (1917); Vance v. Heath, 42 Utah 148, 129
P. 365

(1912); however, continued reliance on these cases is

impracticable.
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In Vance and State Bank of Sevier state statutes
Laws Utah

1907,

§ 2962

and

Comp.

Laws Utah

1917,

(Comp.

§ 7220)

specifically provided that a judgment on appeal could have no res
judicata

effect.

Those

statutes

do

not

exist

today,

hence

further reliance upon those two decisions is not warranted.

In

Schramm-Johnson Drugs, this Court held that a judgment of a city
court can have no res judicata effect when an appeal from city
court is pending in district court which entitles both parties to
a trial de novo.

Such a rule is still good law and the federal

rule is in accord.
at Jurisdiction

See, Wright, Miller and Cooper, supra., n.8

§ 4433;

J. Moore, J. Lucas and T. Currier,

supra., at § 0.416[3]n.22

at p.523-24.

However, the de novo

exception is virtually nonexistent today.

As such, it should not

serve as precedent for the rule that all cases on appeal are not
final.

On the contrary, it should merely be an exception to the

general rule that a judgment on appeal is deemed final until
reversed.
Since the Court in Young relied on three antiquated cases as
authority for the res judicata rule in Utah, the rule should now
be struck down in order to reflect the "rule of fundamental and
substantial justice of public policy and private peace", which
underlies res judicata.

Moitie 452 U.S. at 401 citing Hart Steel
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Co. v. Railroad Supply Co., 244 U.S. 294, 299 (1917).
policy reasons underlie such a result.

Strong

As one judge has said:

[T]hat a judgment is stripped of its res
judicata consequences because it is being
appealed would be contrary to the general
prevailing law. . . .
*

*

*

Such a consequence would also be laughable.
If a judgment was denied its res judicata
effect merely because an appeal was pending,
litigants would be able to refile an identical case in another trial court while the
appeal is pending, which would hog-tie the
trial courts with duplicative litigation. If
the plaintiff wants to appeal the decision of
a trial court, the appropriate course is to
do what the plaintiff here has done — appeal
the ruling in a state appellate court. It is
inappropriate for it to be appealing its case
to another trial court.
Warwick Corp. v. Maryland Department of Transportation, 573 F.
Supp. 1011, 1014

(D.Md. 1983).

While the appellant argues that injustice would result if a
judgment

on

appeal

were

allowed

injustice can be alleviated.

res

judicata

In Community

effect,

such

Bank v. Vassell,

280 Ore. 139, 570 P.2d 66 (1977), the Court described one process
by which this result can be avoided:
Most courts which have considered the matter
have held that when a judgment which has been
given res judicata effect in another case is
later reversed on appeal, that reversal will
be taken into account and given effect upon
an appeal of the case in which the prior
judgment was relied upon.
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Id., at 68.
This

Court

could

follow

a

similar

procedure

to

avoid

any injustice if a case, relied upon as res judicata, is later
reversed on appeal.

Thus, in light of the Moitie decision that

no "public policy" can undermine the doctrine of res judicata,
as well

as the possibility to address any

appellant,

this

Court

should

reverse

Young

injustice to the
and

adopt

"the

better view . . . that a judgment otherwise final remains so
despite the taking of an appeal unless what is called an appeal
actually consists of a trial de novo."

Restatement (Second) of

Judgments § 13 comment f, (1982).

POINT II
A TRIAL COURTfS DETERMINATION OF AN ISSUE WHICH IS NOT
ESSENTIAL TO A JUDGMENT ON APPEAL CANNOT, BY THE
DOCTRINE OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL, BAR LITIGATION
OF THE ISSUE IN A SUBSEQUENT ACTION
If this Court should find that a judgment on appeal can have
no res judicata effect, then appellant's claim that collateral
estoppel

precludes

litigation

of

the

issue

of

whether

the

shooting was intentional or unintentional must be denied.
Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, is only allowed
upon satisfaction of the following four element test set forth
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by the Utah Supreme Court in Searle Bros, v, Searle, 588 P.2d
689, 691 (Utah 1978):
1.
Was the issue decided in the prior
adjudication identical with the one presented
in the action in question?
2.

Was there a final judgment on the merits?

3. Was the party against whom the plea is
asserted a party or in privity with a party
to the prior adjudication?
4.
Was the issue in the first case
competently, fully and fairly litigated?
For purposes of this case, primary focus rests on whether
the

second

proceeding.

and

fourth

tests

were

satisfied

in

the

divorce

When the issue of whether the shooting was inten-

tional was litigated, the trial court in the divorce proceeding
determined that the shooting was intentional and willful. (D.R.
140) .

However, if this Court rules that the divorce judgment

is not a "final" judgment for purposes of res judicata, neither
can

it be

estoppel.

a

final

The

judgment

test

from

for the
Searle,

purposes

supra,

of

collateral

requires

a

final

judgment, not just a final determination of a particular issue.
Appellant

argues

that

since

respondent

only

appealed

the amount of the award in the divorce case all other findings
must stand.
must

be

This contention is erroneous.

final; and

unless

and

until

this

The judgment below
Court

makes

that

judgment final, no part of it can bar another issue collaterally
26

in a subsequent proceeding.

Searle, 588 P.2d at 691; Schaer v.

State By and Through the Utah Department of Transportation, 657
P.2d 1337, 1341 (Utah 1983).
The

fourth

test

mandates

that

an

issue

be

completely,

fully and fairly litigated in the prior proceeding.

An issue

which is fully and fairly litigated must be essential to the
judgment below.

See, Wright, Miller and Cooper, supra, § 4421.

Professor Wright has stated:
The general rule of issue preclusion is that
if an issue of fact or law was actually
litigated and determined by a valid and final
judgment, the determination is conclusive in
a subsequent action between the parties,
whether on the same or a different claim.
The determination must have been essential to
the first judgment, however, and if the court
has determined two issues, either of which
standing independently would be sufficient to
support the result, it cannot be said that
either determination was essential to the
judgment and thus it will not be conclusive
with respect to either issue.
C. Wright, The Law of Federal Courts § 100A 682 (4th Ed. 1983)
(emphasis added).
Thus, the prior judgment must not only be final, but it must
also be essential to any determination made in the trial court.
The divorce court's findings as to the shooting was not essential
because it was one of "two findings either of which standing
independently would be sufficient to support the result. . . • •»
Finding of fact Number 7, as adopted by the divorce court stated:
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During the period of time immediately prior
to the 18th of August, 1980, plaintiff used
intoxicants in excess and was frequently
intoxicated and was abusive and embarrassed
the defendant, all of which constituted
cruel treatment and caused defendant to
suffer great mental distress.,
(D.R. 140.)
The divorce court could have decreed the divorce based upon
either one of two statutory grounds, i.e. habitual drunkenness or
mental cruelty.

Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-1 (1953) makes its clear

that:
Proceedings in divorce shall be commenced and
conducted in the manner provided by law for
proceedings in civil causes, except as
hereinafter provided, and the court may
decree dissolution of the marriage contract
between the plaintiff and the defendant in
all cases . . . for any of the following
causes:
5.
defendant.

Habitual

drunkenness

of

the

7. Cruel treatment of the plaintiff by
the defendant to the extent of causing bodily
injury or great mental distress to the
plaintiff.
The divorce court could have decreed the divorce based upon
two separate statutory grounds without making any unwarranted
mention of an "intentional, willful and wrongful" shooting.
Findings of Fact, numbers 8 and 9.
Thus,
any

further

the

finding which

litigation

(D.R. 140).

appellant

clearly
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See

seeks

to preclude

cannot be barred

pursuant

in
to

collateral estoppel because:

(1) the finding was not essential

to the divorce decree; and (2) this Court may determine that the
divorce judgment

is not a final judgment when it is pending

appeal.
POINT III
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT HAS NOT ABROGATED
THE DOCTRINE OF INTERSPOUSAL IMMUNITY FOR
UNINTENTIONAL TORTS.
The trial court granted partial summary judgment holding the
appellantfs cause of action for negligently caused injury barred
by interspousal immunity.

The trial court reasoned that the Utah

Supreme Court had not abrogated the doctrine for unintentional
torts since the intent of the court in Stoker v. Stoker, 616 P.2d
590 (Utah 1980), was to abrogate immunity only for intentional
tort actions between spouses.
As the respondent's argument will demonstrate, the ruling by
the trial court was correct and should be affirmed by this Court
since Stoker did not broadly abrogate interspousal immunity for
any type of tort whether

intentional

or unintentional.

The

decision only went so far as to reaffirm Taylor v. Patten, 2 Utah
2d 404, 275 P.2d 696 (1954), a decision that allowed an action
between spouses for intentional tort.
contends

that

interspousal

immunity

Furthermore, respondent
for

unintentional

torts

should be upheld by the Court in this case because the doctrine
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supports significant public policy, i.e., it promotes marital
harmony,

it

prevents

collusive

lawsuits,

it

avoids

numerous

trivial and spurious lawsuits, it avoids rewarding the tortfeasor
spouse for wrongdoing, and it does not disturb reliance on the
present state of the law.
A.

Stoker v. Stoker Did Not Abrogate Interspousal Immunity
for Unintentional Torts.

The Utah Supreme Court in Stoker v. Stoker, 616 P.2d at 590
did

not

completely

abrogate

interspousal

intentional and unintentional torts.

immunity

for

both

The court retained the

doctrine to bar actions between spouses for unintentional torts.
That intent is evidenced by the following three reasons.
The

first

reason

Stoker

did

not

abrogate

immunity

for

unintentional torts is that in the decision the court specifically

reaffirmed

decision
against

that

Tavlor v.

allowed

her husband

an

which

Patten.

275 P. 2d at

intentional
the

court

tort
had

696, a 1954

action

by

overruled

a wife

in 1963,

however, the court did not overrule Rubalcava v. Gisseman, 14
Utah 344, 384 P.2d 389 (1963), a decision in which the court held
interspousal

immunity

barred

against her husband's estate.

a

negligence

action

by

a wife

It is apparent that if the intent

of the court was to completely abrogate interspousal immunity, it
would

have

reaffirmed

Taylor,

as

it did,

and

also

overrule

Rubalcava in order to remove the bar to actions between spouses
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for both intentional and unintentional torts.

Failing to do so,

it is clear the intent of the court in Stoker was to carve out an
exception to the doctrine only for intentional tort actions.
This conclusion appears inescapable.
Second, noticeably absent

from the Stoker decision

is a

clear proclamation that interspousal immunity had been completely
overruled

for both intentional and unintentional torts.

Any

statements that could be inferred to grant complete abrogation
were nullified at the end of the opinion when the court reaffirmed Taylor, including its original caveat, and conspicuously
failed to overrule Rubalcava.

Significantly, the caveat sought

to describe certain actions that would not be actionable intentional torts and ended with:
husband

or wife

consents

ff

to

[T]his does not mean that either
intentionally

personal injuries by the other."
cates that the court

inflicted

serious

The end of the opinion indi-

intended to carve out an exception to

interspousal immunity only for intentional torts where serious
injuries had occurred.
facts

and

is

Stoker was intended to be limited to its

restricted

to

an

action

between

spouses

for

intentionally inflicted injury.
The third reason Stoker was not intended as the complete
abrogation of the doctrine is that in references to Stoker in
subsequent

decisions

the

Supreme
31

Court

has

indicated

that

interspousal
torts.

immunity has been overruled only for intentional

In a footnote comment to Bishop v. Nielsen, 632 P.2d 864,

865 n.5 (1981), the Court indicated that the doctrine of interspousal immunity has been recognized in Utah, however, in Stoker
"this court declined to apply the doctrine in an intentional tort
case."

Similar

wording

was

used

by Justice

Durham

in her

dissenting opinion in Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1230
(Utah

1983):

"See,

Stoker

v,

Stoker

[citation

omitted]

confirming wife's right to an action against her husband for
intentional infliction of personal injuries."

Once again, care

was taken to describe the right to bring an action only for an
intentional tort.

These two references to Stoker indicate the

decision carved out an exception to interspousal immunity, thus,
it did not completely abrogate the doctrine for all tort actions
between spouses.
Based on the foregoing three reasons, it is evident that the
court in Stoker intended to only partially open the door to tort
lawsuits between spouses.

By reaffirming Taylor the immunity to

intentional tort actions was removed, however, by not overruling
Ruba1cava, the court left immunity for unintentional tort actions
in place.

The trial court interpreted Stoker in this manner and

correctly ruled that the appellant's claim based on negligence
was barred by interspousal immunity.
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B.

Interspousal
Immunity
Should
Not
Be
Completely
Abrogated To Allow Unintentional Tort Actions Between
Spouses.

It is the respondents contention that interspousal immunity
should not be completely abrogated to allow unintentional tort
actions between spouses.

This Court should not extend the ruling

in Stoker to eliminate the immunity
unintentional torts.
the immunity

for both intentional and

Significant public policy is supported by

rule which strongly mitigates against

abrogating it.

completely

A concise explanation of the policy reasons that

support upholding the doctrine for only unintentional torts is
set
Tort

forth

in Moore, The

Immunity,

Case

for Retention

7 Ohio N.U.L. Rev. p.943

of

Interspousal

(1980), wherein the

author advocates:
It is the writer's position that interspousal
immunity should be abolished in all jurisdictions with respect to intentional torts, but
that it should be retained (or reinstated)
with regard to torts committed negligently.
It is obvious that the old common law basis
for immunity, that husband and wife are one,
no longer has force, but it is submitted that
there are valid policy reasons for continuing
interspousal immunity when the tort has
occurred through negligence.
The policy reasons for maintaining immunity are that (1) it
promotes marital harmony; (2) it prevents collusive lawsuits; (3)
it avoids numerous trivial and spurious lawsuits; and
avoids

rewarding

the

tortfeasor's
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spouse

for

(4) it

wrongdoing

by

directly or indirectly benefiting from an insurance paid award.
These important policy considerations, discussed in detail below,
indicate that the immunity rule for unintentional tort claims is
well founded and should not be disturbed.
Barring

negligence

lawsuits

between

spouses

serves

to

promote and preserve marital harmony by supporting a resolution
to marital problems by customary channels and cooperation between
the couple.

An option to bring a lawsuit as a means of resolu-

tion

serve

would

to

aggravate

marital

tensions

and

likely

irreparably damage a marriage that otherwise could have been
salvaged.

Addressing this concern the Florida Supreme Court in

Corren v. Corren. 47 So. 774 (Fla. 1950) stated:
When one ponders the effect upon the marriage
relationship were each spouse free to sue the
other for every real or fancied wrong . . .
one can imagine what the havoc would be to
the tranquility of the home. Certainly the
success of the . . . institution of marriage
must depend in large degree upon harmony
between the spouses, and the relationship
could easily be disrupted in the lives of
offspring blighted if bickerings blossomed
into lawsuits and conjugal disputes into
vexatious, if not expensive, litigation.
The argument that commission of a tort may be an indication
of

an

absence

of

marital

felicity

fails

to

consider

difference between intentional and unintentional torts.
the commission

of an intentional

the
While

tort tends to support this

position, there is no basis to reason or assume that an act of

negligence
harmony.

(or omission to act) evidences a lack of marital
Clearly, if this Court were to allow negligence actions

between spouses, marital harmony would be greatly strained and
the societal interest in successful marriages and families would
suffer.

That consideration was significant

to the Court in

Rubalcava v. Gisseman, 384 P.2d at 391, when the court ruled that
a wife was barred from bringing a negligence action against her
husband's estate.
The answer to the argument for marital
harmony: that discord will not be engendered
when the insurance company is to pay, is
neither sound nor entirely realistic.
The danger of collusion between spouses for the purpose of
securing

an

mitigating
Public
through

insurance

award

is

the

second

policy

against total abrogation of interspousal

policy

favors

application

the

prevention

of the immunity

of

collusive

reason

immunity.
lawsuits

rule, particularly

collusive suits are difficult to detect.

since

The Ohio Supreme Court

in Lyons v. Lyons. 208 N.E. 2d 533 (1965) explained:
It is argued that the task of weeding out
fraudulent or collusive suits is properly
within the sphere of courts and juries. In
truly adversary cases, fraud is likely
to be uncovered because of the desire of the
defendant to avoid the loss. Where insurance
is involved, the risk of loss is removed, and
both spouses stand to gain from a decision
adverse to the defendant.
This creates
a strong inducement to trump up claims and
conceal possible defenses.

The third policy promoted by interspousal immunity is the
prevention of trivial and spurious lawsuits that could arise from
the

various

opportunities

spouses in a marriage.

for

conflict

and

tension

between

The danger of opening the door to such

actions exists and is not imagined as described in Moore, The
Case for Retention of Interspousal Tort Immunity, 7 Ohio N.U.L.
Rev. 943, 949 (1980):
That
the
danger
of
what
might
be
characterized as strange and improbable suits
is real is illustrated by the cases of Mims
v. Mims [305 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 1974)],
and Brown v. Brown, [409 N.E. 2d 717 (Mass.
1980)] .
In the former case a wife sued her husband
for having fraudulently induced her to marry
him "with false and fraudulent protestations
of love" and having thereafter told her that
he did not love her and then having left
her (in a home defendant had purchased for
the parties), assertedly having done all the
preceding "with wilfulness and malice". The
Florida
District
Court
of Appeal
(4th
District) affirmed a judgment dismissing the
action, citing interspousal tort immunity and
adding:
The primary one [basis for denying
this claim] lies in the demands of
public policy which require, as we
see it, that domestic quarrels-who
did what to whom before and during
a
marriage-should
not
be
the
subject of damage suits and jury
trials.
In Brown, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court held that a wife, injured in a fall
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ascribable to her husband's alleged negligence in failing to shovel the walk after a
snowstorm, could not sue her spouse in
tort.
The final policy reason for upholding interspousal immunity
for unintentional torts is the avoidance of rewarding a defendant
spouse for their wrongdoing by benefiting in an award to the
plaintiff spouse.

In an instance where the husband and wife

cohabit after rendition of a tort award, the tortfeasor spouse
would share directly or indirectly in any purchases made from the
award.

Public policy disfavors a wrongdoer benefiting from their

improper actions.

Abrogating immunity for unintentional torts

would lead to such a result.
Public policy

strongly mitigates against

removing inter-

spousal immunity

from negligent or unintentional tort actions

between spouses.

These four policy considerations weigh heavily

against expanding the Stoker decision to completely abrogate the
doctrine

of

interspousal

immunity.

It

is

the

respondent's

contention that immunity should bar unintentional tort actions
between spouses.
The appellant's contention that this Court is mandated to
interpret Utah's Married Women's Act, Section 30-2-4 Utah Code
Annotated, to allow lawsuits by a wife against her husband for
both

intentional

and unintentional

torts

fails to take

into

consideration the significant policy reasons herein discussed.
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Policy has been the basis for decisions in other jurisdictions
that have held the immunity rule abrogated for intentional torts
but

not

for

unintentional

torts

notwithstanding

the

court's

interpretation of its Married Women's Act.
The Kansas Supreme Court in Stevens v. Stevens, 647 P.2d
1346, 1348 (Kan. 1982), held interspousal immunity abrogated for
intentional torts but kept the doctrine as a bar to unintentional
torts because of public policy reasons.

The court stated:

In light of our Kansas Constitution . . . and
the Kansas Married Women's Act . . . there is
no constitutional or statutory interspousal
immunity . . . .
Accordingly, an exception
to the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity
is now created and declared by this court as
regards wilful and intentional torts. . .

i

We are well aware of the various arguments
put forth that the entire doctrine of
interspousal immunity should be abrogated.
Mr. Justice Prager in his dissenting opinion
in Guffy v. Guffy, 230 Kan. beginning at p.
97, .631 P.2d 646, thoroughly covers and
advocates these arguments. It would serve no
purpose to go back over the counter arguments
set forth in the majority opinion in Guffy.
Suffice it to say a majority of this court
believe it is now the best interest of the
people of this state to retain the doctrine
of interspousal immunity for injuries and
death resulting from negligent or even
reckless acts and to carve out an exception
as regards wilful and intentional torts.

The importance of promoting and preserving marital harmony
by closing the door to negligent tort actions between spouses led
the court in Stevens to only partially abrogate the immunity rule
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notwithstanding its Married Womenfs Act.

The decision serves as

precedent for this Court to follow.
In a related manner, the Idaho Supreme Court in Lorana v.
Hays, 209 P.2d 733 (Idaho 1949) interpreted its Constitution and
Married Women's Act to not bar a wife from bringing an intentional tort action against her husband.

Years later when the

court decided Rogers v. Yellowstone Park Co., 539 P.2d 566 (Idaho
1975), it expanded Lorana by abrogating the doctrine for negligent tort actions between spouses resulting from motor vehicle
accidents.
intact
vehicle

A significant portion of the immunity rule was kept

for all unintentional

torts not

accidents notwithstanding

resulting

from motor

the clear statement

of the

court in Lorana that its statutes [Married Women's Act] removed
the common

law immunity

to actions between

spouses.

Policy

considerations restrained the court from completely abrogating
interspousal immunity in Idaho.
The Massachusetts

Supreme Court carefully weighed policy

considerations when it decided Lewis v. Lewis, 351 N.E. 2d 526
(Mass.

1976)

and

determined

immunity

between

spouses

was

abrogated only for negligence actions arising from motor vehicle
accidents.

Declining to completely abrogate the immunity rule

for all torts, whether intentional or unintentional, the court
stated:
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We conclude therefore that it is open to this
court to reconsider the common law rule of
interspousal immunity and, having done so, we
are of the opinion that it should no longer
bar an action by one spouse against another
in a case such as the present one. . . .
In
arriving at this conclusion we are mindful
that the rights and privileges of husbands
and wives with respect to one another are not
unaffected by the marriage they have voluntarily
undertaken
together.
Conduct,
tortious between two strangers, may not be
tortious between spouses because of the
mutual concessions implied in the marital
relationship. For this reason we limit our
holding today to claims arising out of motor
vehicle accidents.
For additional decisions holding the immunity rule abrogated
for only negligence actions arising from motor* vehicle accidents
and intentional torts, see:

Diabv v. Diqbv, 388 A.2d 1 (RI

1978); Rupert v. Stienne, 528 P.2d 1013 (Nev. 1974); Surratt v.
Thompson, 183 S.E. 2d 200 (Vir. 1971).
At the heart of these decisions is a determination by the
court as to how the institution of marriage would be effected by
allowing spouses to bring lawsuits against one another.

The

majority of courts agree that once an intentional tort has been
committed, the peace and harmony in the marriage has likely been
so damaged that there is little danger that it will be further
impaired by a lawsuit.

However, the same conclusion cannot be

reached by the commission of an act or omission to act which
results in negligent inflection of injuries.
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The wilfullness

or malice to cause harm is absent, hence marital harmony has not
likely

been

irretrievably

lost.

Society's

interest

in

maintaining the institution of marriage along with the policy
considerations of preventing collusive and trivial lawsuits has
caused the courts to limit abrogation of the immunity rule to
only intentional torts and negligent torts arising from motor
vehicle accidents.

A number of decisions, herein explained, have

supported this view notwithstanding existence of Married Women's
Acts similar to Utah's.
Respondent contends that this Court should not extend Stoker
to completely abrogate interspousal immunity in Utah.

Societal

interests are best served with the doctrine in place to bar
unintentional tort actions between spouses.
rule

that

the

trial

court

abrogate interspousal immunity

correctly

This Court should

interpreted

Stoker

to

for only intentional torts and

that the doctrine should be left in place to bar unintentional
tort actions.
CONCLUSION
It is the respondent's contention that this Court should
affirm the ruling of the trial court that held the appellant's
action

for

personal

injuries

doctrine of res judicata.

barred

by

application

of

the

In the prior divorce action, the trial

court fully adjudicated the personal injury issues and granted
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the appellant an award for that claim that was combined into the
alimony and property

settlement determination.

appellant

with

to proceed

this personal

a double

recovery

To allow the

injury

action would

provide

her with

for the personal

injury

claim.

Res judicata is not defeated for the reasons alleged by

the appellant since sufficient portions of the divorce action
record were before the court in this matter and the finality of
a judgment is not disturbed because of an appeal.
In the event of reward, the trial court should be restructed
that

collateral

whether

the

estoppel
shooting

does

not

was

preclude

intentional

re-litigation

or

of

unintentional.

Collateral estoppel requires a final judgment and it requires
that the issue be essential to the ruling of the prior action.
The divorce action could have been determined and rested upon
either

one

of

two

independent

statutory

grounds,

hence

the

shooting issue was not essential to the divorce judgment.
Lastly,

the

respondent

contends

that

this

Court

should

affirm the trial court1s ruling that the appellant's unintentional tort claim was barred by the doctrine of interspousal
immunity.

While an exception to the doctrine has been carved

out for intentional tort actions, the immunity has been left in
place as a complete bar to unintentional tort actions.
doctrine

should

not

be

further
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abrogated

to

allow

The
both

intentional

and

unintentional

tort

because significant public policy
Numerous

other

jurisdictions

have

actions

between

is served by the
relied

upon

spouses
immunity.

these

policy

considerations to partially abrogate interspousal immunity only
for intentional torts, while leaving it as a bar to unintentional
torts.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 31st day of March, 1986.
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